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Abstract
It has been shown that most machine learning algorithms
are susceptible to adversarial perturbations. Slightly per-
turbing an image in a carefully chosen direction in the im-
age space may cause a trained neural network model to mis-
classify it. Recently, it was shown that physical adversarial
examples exist: printing perturbed images then taking pic-
tures of them would still result in misclassification. This
raises security and safety concerns.
However, these experiments ignore a crucial property of
physical objects: the camera can view objects from differ-
ent distances and at different angles. In this paper, we show
experiments that suggest that current constructions of phys-
ical adversarial examples do not disrupt object detection
from a moving platform. Instead, a trained neural network
classifies most of the pictures taken from different distances
and angles of a perturbed image correctly. We believe this is
because the adversarial property of the perturbation is sen-
sitive to the scale at which the perturbed picture is viewed,
so (for example) an autonomous car will misclassify a stop
sign only from a small range of distances.
Our work raises an important question: can one con-
struct examples that are adversarial for many or most view-
ing conditions? If so, the construction should offer very sig-
nificant insights into the internal representation of patterns
by deep networks. If not, there is a good prospect that ad-
versarial examples can be reduced to a curiosity with little
practical impact.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks (NN) are being successful in ac-
complishing challenging tasks such as image classification
[10] and speech recognition [8]. Given the architecture of
the neural net, its parameters are chosen by a training al-
gorithm based on a finite set of the input space, called the
training set, and is expected to generalize.
∗These authors contributed equally
However, a carefully chosen small perturbation of the
input may cause a network to result in a different answer
[23, 3, 18]. In that case, the new input is called an adver-
sarial example. For instance, one can perturb an image to
cause a NN to misclassify it while keeping the change small
enough to not be perceptible to a human eye. Even worse,
these perturbations were found to generalize over different
NN architectures and training datasets. This means that an
attacker can train a classifier and use it to generate adversar-
ial version of an image, then use it to fool another model.
In the past few years, researchers tried to explain why
neural nets are susceptible to such examples despite their
impressive success on random test datasets [6, 5, 2], sug-
gested new methods to generate adversarial examples and
measure NN robustness against them [4, 21, 16, 9, 17, 19,
13], and proposed ways to improve the networks’ robust-
ness against these examples [7, 15, 14]. In all of these cases,
the adversarial perturbation was added to a digital image
then fed as input to the neural network.
Then, the natural question is if these perturbed images
do stay adversarial if taken as input from the physical world
using a camera. They actually do as shown in [11]. There,
the authors generated adversarial examples of images from
the ImageNet dataset using the fast method presented in [6]
and two iterative versions of it. They then printed these ex-
amples and took pictures of them using cellphone cameras.
The images were passed as input to trained neural networks
to demonstrate that the output is still misclassified. That
shows that the adversarial perturbations were robust to the
transformations and the noise resulting from the camera and
phone processing.
Another physical attack against face detection systems
was presented in [22]. The authors demonstrated both black
and white box methods to print sun glasses that cause a
state-of-the-art face recognition system to misclassify the
attacker face to a specific or arbitrary other face. Similar
to [11], the photos were taken from a short distance and a
single photo was taken for each image.
These experiments raise serious safety and security con-
cerns, especially when these networks are incorporated in
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safety-critical systems such as autonomous vehicles. For
example, adding subtle adversarial perturbations, which hu-
mans generally don’t notice, to a stop sign to cause it to be
misclassified as a minimum speed limit sign could lead to
fatal car accidents.
In this paper, we present experiments that show physi-
cal adversarial examples do not generalize over several dis-
tances and angles for object detector. Specifically, we show
that no matter how easy or hard to perceive the physical ad-
versarial perturbations added to stop signs are, most of the
video frames taken from a camera in a car approaching the
adversarial stop signs will be correctly classified. As a re-
sult, the controller of an autonomous car taking the frames
as input will make the right decision most of the time.
2. Methods for Generating Adversarial Exam-
ples
We used the following weak and strong attacks [1], with
various choices of hyper-parameters, to test the robustness
of two neural networks with different architectures. Given
a trained NN, each attack searches for an imageXadv sim-
ilar, from human perspective, to the target image X which
changes the NN classification ofX from class ytrue (repre-
sented as one hot vector) to either an arbitrary or specifically
chosen class yfool. An image X , is a 3-dimensional tensor
representing width, length, and depth. The depth is assumed
to have an integer value between 0 and 255. We follow the
literature in calling the images resulting from running these
methods on some input images adversarial, even if it is not
guaranteed that they will not be classified as ytrue. Finally,
we denote by J(X, y) the cross-entropy cost function where
the input image is X and its true class is y. J is used to
train both of the neural networks that we will be consider-
ing. Also, J is used along with its gradient in the different
methods below to generate adversarial examples.
2.1. Fast Sign method
Goodfellow et al [6] described this simple method of
generating adversarial examples. The applied perturbation
is the direction in image space which yields the highest in-
crease of the linearized cost under l∞ norm. It uses a hyper-
parameter  to govern the distance between adversarial and
original image. Specifically,
Xadv =X +  · sign(∇XJ(X, ytrue)).
when the target fooling class is known as yfool, another up-
date formula can be used.
Xadv =X −  · sign(∇XJ(X, yfool)).
In our experiments, we used  = 0.2 × 255 = 51. This is
very large value for  with respect to the 0.1 and 0.25 values
which have been used in [6]. Higher  values result in larger
perturbation of the image. We want to show that even under
the assumption of a strong attack, the adversarial properties
would not hold across distances and angles, which means
the photo will be correctly classified in the context of an
autonomous vehicle.
2.2. Iterative methods
Kurakin et al. [11] introduced an iterative version of the
fast sign method by applying it several times with a smaller
step size, α, and clipping all pixels after each iteration to
ensure that results stay in the  neighborhood of the original
image. Formally,
Xadv,0 =X,
Xadv,N+1 = ClipX,{Xadv,N
+ α · sign(∇XJ(XN , ytrue))}.
where
ClipX,{X ′} = min{ 255,X (x, y, z) + ,
max{0,X (x, y, z)− ,X ′(x, y, z)}}
and X (x, y, z) is the value of channel z of X at pixel of
coordinate (x, y). Hence, ClipX,{X ′} keeps the values
in X ′ so that it stays in the L∞ -ball around X . In our
experiments, we set α to 10 and the number of iterations to
20. These choices are heuristic.
2.3. L-BFGS method
Szegedy et al [23] suggested that in order to compute an
adversarial example, one could perform a line search using
the box-constrained L-BFGS method to find the perturba-
tion tensorR that minimizes:
c|R|+ J(X +R, yfool),
where c is a weight parameter, R is the perturbation and
X + R is classified with some class yfool different than
ytrue. It is similar to the iterative method, except that the
step size is estimated by L-BFGS, and no pixel clipping is
applied.
2.4. Attacking a detector
The current literature primarily investigates attacks
against classifiers, i.e. generating adversarial examples that
fool classifiers. In this paper, we extend it to attacking the
YOLO multiple object detector [20] 1. When we feed an
image as an input to the neural network part of the detector,
the YOLO network outputs the vector poutput. In the case
1https://github.com/thtrieu/darkflow
of a classifier, we use the cross-entropy cost function be-
tween the output (poutput) and the one hot vector yfool (or
ytrue). In the case of a detector, there is no such one hot vec-
tor, yfool, and we set the vector yfool to have same length
as poutput (write lpoutput ), and each element has the same
value of 1/lpoutput . Because lpoutput is relatively large, each
element of poutput approaches zero, meaning that nothing is
detected. In summary, to attack the multiple object detec-
tor we replace yfool with a near zero vector and otherwise
follow the recipe for attacking a classifier. This adversarial
attack against the detector may seem a bit odd, but it can
generate adversarial images that fool detectors reliably. We
used this method to attack detectors for all results in this
paper.
Generally, the L-BFGS method makes smaller modifica-
tions to the input but has a higher rate of successful attacks.
Similarly, the Iterative method outperforms the Fast Sign
method. This is for attacks that consist of image modifi-
cations; in what follows, we focus on physical attacks (i.e.
those made by imaging real objects).
3. Physical Adversarial Examples
Physical adversarial examples differ from virtual adver-
sarial examples because the camera position is now not con-
trolled. This means, for example, the distance from the
camera to the physical object can change, changing the pat-
tern of pixels in the resulting image. Our experiments sug-
gest that this disrupts most attacks severely. We focus on
distance between camera and object, but show some results
from camera rotation below as well.
We follow [11] in using the destruction rate to evaluate
the effectiveness of the methods to generate adversarial ex-
amples in the physical world. Destruction rate measures the
percentages of perturbed images that are no longer adver-
sarial in the physical world. It was defined as follows:
d =
∑n
k=1 C(X
k, yktrue)C(X
k
adv, y
k
true)C(T (X
k
adv), y
k
true)∑n
k=1 C(X
k, yktrue)C(X
k
adv, y
k
true)
,
where n is the total number of images, Xk is the kth im-
age, yktrue is its true class, and X
k
adv is the perturbed ver-
sion ofXk generated by the method that we are evaluating,
and T (·) represents an arbitrary transformation of the image
represented here by printing it and taking a photo of it from
some distance and angle. Finally,
C(X, y) :=
{
1, if image X is classified as y
0, otherwise,
and C(X, y) = 1 − C(X, y). If the destruction rate in-
creases when the transformation changed from T to T ′, for
example by changing the distance at which we take the pho-
tos, it means that the adversarial perturbation is less effec-
tive for T ′.
3.1. Controlled Experimental Setup
We generated adversarial examples against both the
YOLO detector and the traffic sign classifier, and then
printed out these adversarial images. We simulated the pro-
cess of a car driving by the printed signs, and checked the
YOLO detector’s detection rate. Specifically, we did the
following steps:
1. We drove and took 180 photos of stop signs with an
iPhone 7 from the passenger side window of the car.
The photos were taken from a variety of different an-
gles and distances under different lighting conditions.
These samples represent the average case in [11]. They
are random samples generated by normal driving con-
ditions. They were not meant to represent extreme
weather and lighting conditions.
2. We installed the pretrained open-source object detector
Darkflow (YOLO). The model is pretrained on MS-
COCO dataset [12], which includes the class of stop
sign. For each of the first 100 images collected, we
generated three adversarial images based on the dark-
flow detector using the three different methods de-
scribed in Section 2.
3. We trained a VGG16 traffic sign classifier from scratch
using the German traffic signs dataset2. However, that
classifier was not able to recognize US stop signs. To
solve that issue, we added the first 150 of our collected
cropped stop sign images to the training set. For the
remaining 30 images, we generated adversarial exam-
ples using the three different methods in Section 2s.
4. We computed the detection rate on the full size non-
cropped digital original images and perturbed images.
The results are shown in the third column in table 1.
5. We manually cropped the stop signs from the first 100
collected clean images and generated three perturbed
versions for each one of them against the detector. An
example of a cropped stop sign and its perturbed ver-
sions are shown in Figure 1. We checked the detec-
tion rate on these 400 digital images and the results
are shown in the first four rows of the fourth column
in table 1. We also cropped and generated adversarial
examples for the last 30 images against the classifier,
and the results are shown in the last four rows in the
same column. An example of a cropped clean sign and
its perturbed versions against the classifier are shown
in Figure 2.
2http://benchmark.ini.rub.de/
No Attack FastSign Attack Iterative Attack LBFGS Attack
Figure 1: Adversarial examples for YOLO detector. In this case, adversarial perturbations have relatively high frequency, so
the perturbations are more visible from near distance and cannot be preserved for far distance.
No Attack FastSign Attack Iterative Attack LBFGS Attack
Figure 2: Adversarial examples for traffic sign classifier. In this case, adversarial perturbations have relatively low frequency,
so the perturbations are relatively more visible from far distance.
6. We printed the resulting (100 + 30) × 4 cropped stop
signs’ images on A4 papers, then took photos of them
from two distances: 0.5m and 1.5m (Figure 3). Note
that we chose these distances since A4 papers (8.27
in × 11.7 in) are much smaller the actual US stop
signs (18 in × 18 in, 24 in × 24 in, or 30 in × 30
in) which means that taking a photo from these dis-
tances is equivalent to taking the photo of a real stop
sign from few meters as a car camera would do. Then,
we computed the detection rate on these retake pho-
tos. The results are shown in the sixth column in table
1. We show another example of failed physical adver-
sarial attack with four printed signs together in Fig-
ure 4. (The photos were taken using a Logitech C922
Pro camera; the printer used is imageRUNNER AD-
VANCE C5030.)
Remark 1 Our results suggest that physical attacks on a
detector are ineffective, likely because of the camera move-
ments (changes in “distance”). To control for the possibil-
ity that our attack on the detector might have unanticipated
consequences, we also attacked a classifier. Note that, in
this case, distance makes attacks ineffective as well.
3.2. Controlled Experiment Results and Analysis
There are four metrics of classification accuracy that we
care about: accuracy on clean images, on perturbed ones,
and on the photos taken of the printed clean and perturbed
images. Refer to Table 1.
The detection rate on the clean photos was only 30% and
that is because in many of the images, the stop signs were
far and not easily detectable by the detector. An example
of these images is shown in Figure 5. Furthermore, adding
adversarial perturbations to the images decreased the detec-
tion rate significantly (see column 3 in table 1).
One may expect that cropping the stop signs from the im-
ages would help the detector recognize the stop sign. How-
ever, the detection rate decreased significantly after crop-
ping as shown in the fourth column in table 1. The clean
images, which were misclassified when they were full im-
ages, are probably images of signs taken from a distance or
under poor lighting conditions. Cropping these images and
rescaling them did not add extra features or improve the
conditions for the detector, so it is reasonable that they re-
main misclassified. Cropping the stop signs from correctly
classified images removed the background, resulted in some
of them being misclassified. This suggests that the back-
ground provides some feature information to the detector.
The decrease in the detection rate for the perturbed versions
of the cropped signs is expected. In these cases, in addition
to the background issue, the adversarial perturbation is fo-
cused on the stop sign rather than the whole non-cropped
image. So with the same adversarial target, adding adver-
sarial perturbation after cropping results in a stronger attack
than adding it before.
Surprisingly, printing these cropped images and taking
photos of them increased the detection rate significantly.
For example, the detection rate on the photos taken of clean
images from a 0.5m distance is 65%, which is much larger
No Attack FastSign Attack Iterative Attack LBFGS Attack
0.5m
1.5m
Figure 3: This figure shows experiment setup, and we use the printed stop signs to simulate real stop signs with natural
background. These are examples for successful 0.5 meters and 1.5 meters detection: both original images and adversarial
examples are detected in both distances. It demonstrates that adversarial examples in a physical setting do not reliably fool
stop sign detectors.
Adversarial Target Images Ori DR% Crop DR% Distance Physical DR% Relative DR% Destruction Rate%
Detector
Original 30% 11% 0.5m 65% 100% NA1.5m 28% 100% NA
Fast Sign Adv 8% 0% 0.5m 57% 88% 78%1.5m 29% 104% 82%
Iterative Adv 0% 0% 0.5m 29% 45% 32%1.5m 27% 96% 86%
LBFGS Adv 6% 3% 0.5m 34% 52% 51%1.5m 33% 118% 93%
Classifier
Original 37% 14% 0.5m 67% 100% NA1.5m 30% 100% NA
Fast Sign Adv NA 0% 0.5m 47% 70% 70%1.5m 7% 23% 22%
Iterative Adv NA 0% 0.5m 40% 60% 60%1.5m 20% 67% 67%
LBFGS Adv NA 3% 0.5m 67% 100% 90%1.5m 34% 113% 100%
Table 1: This table summarizes the physical adversarial attack experiments. All the evaluations are performed with pretrained
YOLO detector, and DR means stop sign detection rate. The top half of the table summarizes the adversarial examples gen-
erated from the detector, and the bottom half of the table summarizes the adversarial examples generated from the classifier.
Ori DR denotes the detection rate on the full scene images with stop signs. Crop DR denotes the detection rate on images
that are cropped close to the edges of the stop signs. We print the original and various adversarial stop signs out, and put
them in different distances. Physical DR means the detection rate on these retaken images (see Figure 3). Relative DR means
the relative detection rate between the same setting adversarial images and original images. Destruction Rate is calculated as
Section 3. From the table, we can tell that the destruction rate of adversarial examples for detector in 1.5 meters is high, and
that in 0.5 meters might be high. It means the physical detector adversarial attacks are not successful across different dis-
tances, especially when the distance is far and the small patterns are not visible. The destruction rate of adversarial examples
for the classifier varies by distance for the Fast Sign attack, remains relatively high for the Iterative attack, and is high for the
LBFGS attack. This suggests that physical classifier adversarial attacks are also not successful across different distances.
LBFGS Attack
No Attack
FastSign Attack
Iterative Attack
Figure 4: Example for detecting four images together. One
original non adversarial stop sign and three different adver-
sarial stop signs are all detected as stop signs. It means
adversarial attacks on sign detectors fail.
Figure 5: A far stop sign. The image will be further resized
and fed into a YOLO detector, while YOLO is not good at
detecting small objects. As a result, detecting the stop sign
would be hard.
than that on the clean cropped images (11%). This suggests
that the performance of the darkflow detector at identify-
ing stop signs improves when there is a high contrast back-
ground rather than when the object dominates the frame.
Moreover, as expected, taking the photos from further
away decreased the detection rate of the detector. This can
be seen in the last column of table 1. As an example, the
detection rate on the photos of the clean images decreased
from 65% to 28% when we took the photos from a distance
of 1.5m instead of 0.5m.
The major idea of the paper is that distance will corrupt
the adversarial perturbation. This can be seen in the last
two columns of table 1. For instance, the relative detection
rate between the photos taken of the images resulting from
the Iterative method and the original images increased from
29/65 = 45% at 0.5m to 27/28 = 96% at 1.5m. Similarly
the destruction rate, increased from 32% to 86%. The in-
crease when we consider the Fast Sign method instead of
the Iterative method is smaller (from 88% to 104%) since
it is already a weak attack; the detection rate is 57% for
photos taken from 0.5m of images generated using the Fast
Sign method.
Notice that it is not necessary that the relative detection
rate increases as distance increases, it is only the case that
the adversarial perturbation is most effective at some par-
ticular distance and its effectiveness decreases for other dis-
tances. For example, the relative DR decreased from 70% to
23% when the photos of images produced by the Fast Sign
method, attacking the classifier, were taken from a 1.5m dis-
tance instead of 0.5m. In that case, the adversarial pertur-
bation was more effective at 1.5m than at 0.5m. This is
likely because the adversarial perturbations generated from
attacking the classifier were generally coarser and thus more
recognizable from a distance (see Fig. 1 and Fig. 2).
Finally, the key idea is that if an adversary added a phys-
ical perturbation to a stop sign, since the camera has a fixed
resolution, the sign will be misdetected by an autonomous
car detector at a certain distance, but it will still be detected
from other distances. Thus, it will not be a dangerous threat
as the control system should identify that there is a stop
sign by a simple rolling majority voting algorithm over the
frames. As attacks are weaker at distance, the rolling ma-
jority voting algorithm should begin with many frames in
which the stop sign is correctly identified once the vehi-
cle passes the maximum detection distance for the detector.
The details of an experiment to check what happens in real
life in such situations is shown in the next section.
4. Experiment in Real Life
In this section, we describe an experiment we performed
to test the ability of different adversarial methods in Section
2 to cause an autonomous car to misdetect a stop sign.
The experiment consists of the following steps:
1. We printed eight images corresponding to two stop
signs along with their adversarial versions attacking
the detector on two 34in ×44in posters using an HP
DesignJet Z5600 printer and cut them to individual
signs. We also printed one image with its adversar-
ial versions on two posters of the same size and using
the same printer.
2. We attached these signs to an actual stop sign one at a
time.
3. We attached a Logitech C922 Pro camera to the wind
shield of a Lincoln MK-Z car and connected it to a
server in the car with darkflow installed.
No Attack FastSign Attack Iterative Attack LBFGS Attack
0.5m
1.5m
Figure 6: Example of the effects of distance. Stop signs are detected for non-adversarial examples and all adversarial
examples when the distance is 0.5 meters, however none are detected at a distance of 1.5 meters. Small stop signs in the
image are difficult for YOLO to detect regardless of whether they are adversarial examples or not.
4. We started recording video with 2 frames/second rate
while running the detector in real time.
5. We drove toward the stop sign several times with dif-
ferent versions of printed stop signs attached.
There are several observations from the experiments:
• The printed stop signs (both original version and ad-
versarial versions) are first detected from a closer dis-
tance than for an actual stop sign. As mentioned ear-
lier, this is expected since the size of the printed sign is
smaller and the image blurrier than actual stop signs,
which are more reflective and have higher intensity.
• Rarely were the printed perturbed stop signs misclas-
sified, since as the car approaches the stop sign, the
distance and angle change and eventually the stop sign
disappears from the frames. In other words, the camera
was not close enough to the stop sign to recognize the
adversarial perturbation to make the sign misdetected.
• In one case, a printed perturbed stop sign was misde-
tected as a sports ball in only two frames and it was de-
tected correctly in the rest (see Figure 7). This misde-
tection most likely occurred due to the low resolution
and natural detection error rather than due to our per-
turbation. In other cases, the printed adversarial sign
and non-adversarial sign are similar.
In another experiment in the lab, we formed the hypothe-
sis that even the angle from which we took the photo impact
the effectiveness of the adversarial perturbation. A stop sign
and a perturbed version using fast sign method were printed
on a poster. Both were classified correctly from a distance
between 20cm and 2m. When the distance between the
camera and the poster is around 20cm, one capture angle
consistently led darkflow to misdetect the perturbed image
as a toilet while the clean sign remained correctly detected
(see Figure 8). This is important for our use case, since as
a car approaches a stop sign, the angle of capture changes.
Hence, if the perturbation generated by a method requires
some angle of capture for it to be adversarial, it would most
likely not form a significant threat for an autonomous car as
it will be take images from different angles as it approaches
the sign, so some of the frames will be detected correctly.
5. Discussion
For attacking detectors in Section 2.4, YOLO regresses
a flattened vector corresponding various estimates for each
cell within a grid-partitioned image. Our adversarial gen-
eration method perturbs this entire vector which contains
bounding box coordinates, object confidences and class
confidences. Even though this attacking method can effi-
ciently generate adversarial examples against the detector,
it is not an ideal method of attack because it focuses a lot of
effort on modifying unrelated objectives. In sum, this attack
method might make our adversarial examples less relatively
weak, so easier to detect in the real circumstances. In future
works, we would like to identity the class confidence por-
tion of the vector and generate attacks that only modify the
stop sign class confidence values.
Because the detector will make mistakes even without
adversarial perturbations, it is important to distinguish be-
tween error resulting from the natural error rate of the de-
tector and error due to adversarial effects. We have found it
generally reliable to take multiple images in the same set-
Figure 7: In the video sequence of autonomous vehicle approaching a printed perturbed stop sign, the stop sign is misclassified
into a sports ball in two frames, and classified correctly in all other frames of various distances.
Figure 8: In the video sequence, the camera moves in close proximity around a printed original stop sign image and a printed
adversarial stop sign. The original stop sign is always detected as stop sign while the adversarial stop sign is detected as toilet
for two frames in an angle (detected as stop sign in all other angles).
ting, as detector errors are quite random while adversarial
effects are quite consistent.
Our hypothesis that distance will affect adversarial ex-
amples is verified by many experiments, however we only
performed a simple experiment to test our hypothesis that
angles also impact the effectiveness of adversarial exam-
ples. In future works, we would like to design a compre-
hensive experiment to verify this angle hypothesis.
In our experiments, we used a drastically larger epsilon
in all attacking methods. As known in the literature, larger
epsilon could generate adversarial examples at higher rate
and form possibly stronger attacks. We also performed ex-
periments with small epsilon (not reported in the paper),
and these adversarial attacks are even less effective in the
physical world. The usage of larger epsilon makes it hard to
compare against existing literature, but it makes the points
of this paper clearer.
Our work raises an important question: can one construct
examples that are adversarial for many or most viewing con-
ditions? If so, the construction should offer very significant
insights into the internal representation of patterns by deep
networks. If not, there is a good prospect that adversarial
examples can be reduced to a curiosity with little practical
impact.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we showed empirically that even if adver-
sarial perturbations might cause a deep neural network de-
tector to misdetect a stop sign image in a physical environ-
ment when the photo is taken from a particular range of
distances and angles, they cannot reliably fool object de-
tectors across a scale of different distances and angles. We
collected images of stop signs and generated perturbed ver-
sions of them using three different adversarial attack meth-
ods, attacking both a classifier and an object detector. We
used the YOLO detector to test and measure the detection
rate on all of these images. Then, we printed them, took
photos from different distances, and checked the fraction of
the perturbed versions that did not remain adversarial (de-
struction rate) at each distance. The destruction rate is high
in most cases and increases when the distance increases.
Finally, we showed with a small experiment that the angle
from which we take the photo can also change the effec-
tiveness of an adversarial perturbation. In summary, exist-
ing adversarial perturbation methods applied to stop sign
detection (with our dataset and controlled experiment) only
work in carefully chosen situations, and our preliminary ex-
periment shows that we might not need to worry about it
in many real circumstances, specifically with autonomous
vehicles.
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